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SOME ETHICAL ASPECTS OF FEMINISM AND EMANSIPATION

Abstract

Since its birth, feminism has been closely associated with emancipation. And now it is understood primarily as the liberation of women from discrimination, other trends remain, rather, the exception. Moreover, liberation as a goal is rarely called into question. At the same time, freedom is an ethical category, and the desire for liberation inevitably raises moral questions. Therefore, the connection between feminism and ethics is not accidental. The topics that I want to touch on are, in my opinion, key to understanding this connection. I will begin the discussion with what exactly feminism seeks to free itself from, and for this I will remind you of some facts of female discrimination.

Most women in modern society are overburdened with double work: housework and work to earn financial security. As a result, they give up their careers for the careers of a husband. Well, if he understands this, and if he considers his personal success as a result of joint efforts, and not just his talent. The burden of homework interferes with both professional growth and political activity. If a woman, not neglecting her two works, begins to engage in politics, then this activity - participation in rallies, congresses, the search for sponsors and maintaining relations with them, participation in elections - becomes her third job. It is not surprising that in such a situation, women rarely achieve leadership positions, both in government and in business. Needless to say, double loading leaves few opportunities for continuing education.

Keywords: modern society, liberation of women, ethical issues

Theory

The society has developed inherently discriminatory division of labor. In key sectors for the modern economy - heavy and mining, energy, transport - mostly men work, receiving, respectively, a large salary. But women receive what is called “by the residual principle” —the spheres of health, education, public services, social work — labor that is considered less valuable, and therefore low-paid. In addition to lesser value, it is characterized by temporary employment - this work, as it were, does not require constant training and is generally regarded as less qualified.

A similar division exists in the family. Tradition requires a woman to work in the household and raising children, and a man requires material support for the family. In addition, as a rule, a woman provides a comfortable emotional climate in the family. And often does this with the help of real or visible concessions.

The most common explanation for this role distribution is a reference to the natural physical and mental fitness of women in relationships with people and in private life, and for men, with relationships in technology and public life. Even the social activities of women are largely regarded as a continuation of her functions as a mother and wife. As the difference between feminine nature and masculine nature, they call it greater sensitivity to personal relationships, caution, less risk aversion, necessary in business and politics. (Deutsch. E., P. 30-40) Women are considered more conservative, their special, reminiscent of symbiosis, relationships with children, passive female and active male principles are articulated. Finally, it is believed that women are not only physically weaker, but can also show excessive pity where toughness is necessary for the good of the cause. In general, they are not inclined to attach so much importance to work as men, and career failures are much less reflected in their self-esteem.

All these differences can be reduced to one thing: women are more adapted to life in the private sphere, and men - in the public. The private sphere is the sphere of personal relations, care, courtship, affection, and independence. The public sphere is the sphere of anonymous relations, technology, risk, independence. In the private sphere, the emotional climate and the organization of life together are important; in the public sphere, independence and success. In the private sphere, relations with things are mediated by

relations with people, in the public sphere - on the contrary. Compliance and compliance are important in the private sphere, and confidence and strength in the public sphere.

I will not dispute this point of view on the differences between masculine and feminine, in many ways mythological, as well as discuss how much they are determined by nature, and how much education and stereotypes. I will also not discuss the legitimacy of using differences as a means of discrimination. It is enough for me that the differences exist, and the described picture correctly captures, at least in the main, this tendency. What is the meaning of such differences? My first thesis reads: the described differences between women and men are determined by the structure of responsibility. This is not about how they arose, but about how they are reproduced and maintained. I am far from saying that women are responsible and men are irresponsible. I think they have a different type of responsibility. But I am also far from relativism, which makes unjustified judgments about male and female from the point of view of ethics and believes that these responsibilities have equal rights to exist. I must say that the female type seems to me more authentic, more complete.

Discussion

We begin the discussion by considering the specifics of personal relationships. What does it mean to treat another person as a person, and not as a thing? First of all, both he and I have freedom. But it is not freedom of choice that is essential, but freedom of the beginning, and it means not just indifference to choice and independence from external influences. It means the ability to start something as if there was no tribal or personal history, as if there was no causality that defines actions. This is not just the freedom to choose an action, but the freedom to create an absolutely new choice, an absolutely new opportunity. Running a little ahead, I'll say that this is freedom from oneself, from "cluttering oneself" and openness to the appeals of others. I experience my own and other people's freedom in different ways. I see it in myself, for example, in the process of learning or in an act of sudden comprehension - always when I suddenly find an opportunity that I did not even suspect existed. As for freedom of choice, it is only a special case of freedom of beginning.

Otherwise, I experience the freedom of another. I do not have direct access to it, so his freedom is not recognized, but recognized. Indeed, how can one relate to someone

else's freedom? Firstly, it may not be recognized. One of the ways of such non-recognition is to explain the actions of another, in which he fits into a predetermined scheme and thereby is deprived of the freedom to start. Another person is considered as a creature, completely and completely determined by its biological, mental or social nature. Another way of non-recognition of freedom is personal autonomy, that is, achieving a self-sufficient state when the freedom of another, his evasion of the final schematization, simply ceases to concern me.

The ways of recognizing freedom are also diverse. Foreign freedom, its unpredictability, in general, threatens me, and in defense, I attack myself. The coexistence of free personalities is a confrontation of forces. The result is either a "war of all against all" or an always unstable balance of these forces. The best solution here is a balance of concessions, but they still remain concessions, that is, at least inevitable and tolerant, but evil. An increase in the freedom of some means an inevitable decrease in the freedom of others. If someone is striving for power and authority, then he must be opposed with great power and power that can limit him in the interests of all. Therefore, the ideal balance of interests leads to the recognition of a certain total force that subjugates everyone. This power can be not only the state, but also any supra-individual entity - tradition, majority decision, community of culture, religion, race.

Despite the differences, all the described methods have a common feature: they treat the other person as a threatening force that must be either limited or neutralized. But is it possible to relate to another differently? And what does that mean? Is a situation possible in which the force stops? Yes, and this is a problem of ethics. When I understand that my every act may harm another person, my right to use force is called into question. When I understand that another needs my participation, my right to self-realization is also called into question. Attitude is thus changing. I not only recognize the right of another to be free, I also recognize his right to my freedom. The pattern of confrontation of forces is destroyed, because my strengths and abilities cease to be only mine. Moreover, the rejection of power does not mean my passivity. To help another, of course, strength is needed, but to be moral is not enough strength in itself. It is also important that we are not talking here about any kind of force pressure from the other, about coercion. Just his silent suffering, the suffering that I can alleviate, is already enough to put me in a situation of moral responsibility, where every act of mine, even deviation from action, will inevitably

be the answer to another. So my very existence receives an ethical burden, and this happens irreversibly.

Another aspect of the ethical relationship follows from the fact that we, as freely existing, are not directly accessible to each other. This means that any of my ideas about him, any of his images may turn out to be wrong. I never know another to the end; since actions come only from him as from the center, so far as they are not predictable from the outside. However, a genuine attitude to another implies not only the rejection of one's own prejudices. The inaccessibility of another also means that his problems cannot be resolved within my own sphere. This is their difference from my problems, which I can always eliminate, at least in principle, by simply changing the settings, by a simple solution not to consider them as problems. The suffering of another requires my answer, that is, a way out of my own sphere. This is where genuine relationships arise. Another, or rather his needs and sufferings, literally pulls me out of the sphere of caring for my own needs and demands sacrifice. A truly personal attitude, treating a person as a person, again turns out to be an ethical concept.

I want to emphasize two more points. Firstly, entering into ethical relations, I do not lose my freedom. On the contrary, only being free can I participate in them. But this freedom is more fundamental than simple freedom of choice. In order to hear another and adequately answer him, I must be free from all determinism. My actions should not be guided by biological nature, unconscious or social prejudices. That is why the essence of morality is not just submission to any kind of moral code, but a free answer to someone else who needs me. Morality implies constant doubt in one's own actions and values, impossible without freedom.

Secondly, ethical relations are not reduced to merging, symbiosis. Submitting to a moral requirement, I do not unite with another into a certain organic whole; a society united ethically is not just like an organism. Such unity, even once achieved, is immediately destroyed by a constant doubt in the correctness of my actions in relation to another. And this is not a flaw, on the contrary, unshakable confidence in their actions. The absence of doubts about one's own justice is an indicator of a lack of ethical relations, a refusal to recognize another person in his originality and freedom.

So, we see that the ethical attitude to another person consists, firstly, in recognizing in him a unique and free personality and, secondly, in taking on his needs and needs.

This description of ethical relationships allows us to distinguish two types of responsibility: for oneself and for others. Their difference is radical, but they do not exclude each other. Responsibility for oneself is responsibility for one's own actions, that is, the adoption of any of their consequences without shifting the blame to another. Man himself is the smith of his own happiness and is guilty of his own failures. He considers the world as the result of his actions, his choice. This is the position of ultimate courage and risk, preparedness for death, and here one's own life is at stake. This is the ideal of the Enlightenment - a man who made himself (self-made man). He does not have a single conviction not once accepted by a responsible decision; he believes everything with his own mind. This is the position of principled non-conformism, sometimes alone opposing everyone.

However, responsibility for one's actions remains immoral if the acts themselves are immoral. It is often forgotten that responsibility is not enough for morality. It should become a responsibility for others, for their safety, tranquility, happiness, for the satisfaction of their needs. This second responsibility, of course, includes responsibility for one's actions and taking the blame on oneself, but it is no longer about guilty of one's own failures, but about causing suffering to others. Constant doubt about the legitimacy of their actions involves this responsibility in an endless movement towards justice. I am trying to defend a radical point of view here: stopping this movement, confidence in justice already means immorality and breaking off genuine relations with another.

As a small departure from the topic, I note that these two types of responsibility are not so named. They are precisely the ways that one person answers another. More precisely, it is something like a setting, on the basis of which a person forms his specific answers to new situations for him. The installation itself does not and should not contain any specific ways or ideals of behavior. The imperative "Be yourself!", As well as "Be fair!" does not give recipes for how to do this.

This raises the problem of describing these structures. The fact is that they are not captured by the substantialist model and should rather be described in terms of modes of existence. This means that they do not characterize specific answers, but rather how they

enter the world, for which they appeared in it. That is why any event, any action can be both moral and immoral.

Let's return to our main topic. Now it's clear that in the public sphere there is responsibility for actions, and in the private sphere responsibility for others. In other words: in the public sphere people are treated as means for self-realization, in the private sphere as unique and free personalities, claiming to be my freedom.

Of course, I am describing an extreme case. The real situation is greatly mitigated by the interweaving and mutual influence of these areas. However, I think that the forms of discrimination that I described at the beginning are parallel to the difference in the structure of relations. Moreover, it is the great responsibility of women for others that causes them discrimination. They take care of raising children, protecting them, establishing relationships in the family, and most of the social work. This burden is heavier, because it requires constant attention, and the bet in it is not one's own success or failure, but the happiness or even the existence of others. Ensuring someone else's life is harder than your own. Hence, female caution and conservatism, because we are talking about others, not about ourselves. In addition, this work is indispensable and urgent. You can leave the business and switch to politics, but leaving children or people in need of help is much more difficult. As a result, a woman taking responsibility for others puts her at a disadvantage in terms of public success. And since in society it is precisely those who have achieved such success that dominate, women are discriminated against. (I repeat once again that I am not talking about the occurrence of discrimination and its causes, but only about one of the mechanisms of its reproduction and preservation.)

How can one think in this situation of liberation from discrimination? The first and most obvious way is to understand emancipation as gaining independence and freedom for self-realization (Jaggar, A., 1983 pp. 5-21) But is the ideal of self-realization so good? In itself, it means the full development of the makings of man and goes back to Protestant ideas about the mission of man given to him by God, about calling to fulfill his duty on earth. In the desacralized version, self-realization becomes an independent value. The development of makings becomes important in itself, and not for the sake of more successful service to God in its place. To be realized, a person must be free. Therefore, any restriction of his freedom is regarded as discrimination, and the main evil of the latter is an obstacle to self-realization. Therefore, when

speaking of emancipation, feminism often means the free self-realization of women, the free development of their internal forces. "Become yourself!" - this is the imperative of liberation.

Feminism speaks of women as victims, bearing in mind the obstacles to their self-realization. He also speaks of women's dependence on men, material and ideological, and calls for liberation as independence. Ideal independence is complete autonomy, in which no one and nothing affects anyone's opinions and actions. This is not just about isolation, but about relying only on oneself, on one's own experience. From a victim of circumstances, a woman should become the mistress of her fate and maximize her own natural inclinations.

These ideals are not as harmless as they seem. If now we recall the division into spheres of responsibility for ourselves and for others, we will see that this set of values refers to the first of them. Its general focus is to maintain and affirm itself in the face of forces opposing me - both anonymous and emanating from other people. These ideals suggest an ontology of power. The reason is that the self-realization of some one way or another limits the self-realization of others. In relation to my self-realization, as a goal, the other can be either an obstacle or a means. The ethics of self-realization is nothing but refined, that is, purified from the most repulsive manifestations, selfishness. Therefore, emancipation is always associated with violence, with the desire to change the balance of power in their favor. Someone is a victim to one degree or another.

Does this criticism of the ideals of independence and self-realization imply the need to abandon them? Of course not. They just have an ethical meaning only when applied to another. Not mine, but other people's freedom and self-realization are truly moral values. The thing is that ethical relations are fundamentally asymmetrical. Without limits, all moral requirements apply only to me. I can demand sacrifice from myself, but is it right to demand from another? My freedom is only a necessary condition for his release. My freedom means my independence from circumstances that are external to the event of meeting with another. It means the impartiality of my gaze and my response, focusing only on his needs. Such freedom does not in any way mean independence from another in the sense of being closed to him.

Self-realization cannot be self-valuable. After all, if my harmonious and full development impedes the development of others, should I not abandon it? It can be argued

that such a denial leads to discrimination and condones violence. This is true if we are in a world of opposing forces. But the specificity of ethical relations lies in the fact that they refuse to use force for self-preservation. Strength can only be used to assert justice in relation to others, to protect others. A force directed only at me, I can oppose only a call to conscience, but not a counter force. There is also a moral asymmetry. For ethics, violence against me is absolutely not important, but it is very important violence that I myself commit or can commit. Ethics is the desire to reduce my own violence, or rather, violence through my fault - cause or connivance.

On the other hand, there is a tendency to consider traditional female and male values as equal and additional. In particular, postmodernism rejects the very possibility of comparing feminine and masculine behavior in terms of their legitimacy. Since, as he believes, any point of view is historically and culturally determined, including the point of view of a critic, one cannot criticize someone else's position in general. If we decide on this, then we admit violence consisting in unjustified universalization of our views and suppression of strangers. This view does not take into account that this kind of relativism cannot be extended to ethics. Indeed, each of the independent and not reducible to each other points of view should nevertheless be considered precisely as a point of view, moreover, someone else's, and therefore not reducible to my own. Such consideration requires recognition of her not of this meaning, but of the person expressing her right to originality. But such an attitude towards someone else's point of view is ethical. Therefore, ethics is a condition for the possibility of a postmodern world and relativism itself. This unifying pluralistic world trend does not boil down to a universalizing discourse reasonably criticized by postmodernism. Indeed, ethics consists in doubt in any universalizing point of view. The justice referred to in ethics is itself not a universalizing point of view, but rather a constant desire to surpass any degree of justice achieved.

Therefore, contrary to moral relativism of this kind, the ethics of responsibility for others has an absolute priority. For it is not one of the ethics among many others, but ethics in itself. At the same time, of course, one should not strictly connect her only with women, although historically they adhere to her to a greater extent than men. One should also not expand the model of family relations into the public sphere, especially since not everything is smooth in a modern family. Rather, the ethics of responsibility for others is universal,

and we should talk about its presence in all areas of life: family, politics, economics, parenting, etc.

The values of the ethics of responsibility for actions must be subordinate to the ethics of caring for others. This not only does not diminish them, but on the contrary, only in this way can they become truly moral values. Their very meaning then changes. Freedom becomes freedom from external and internal influences that prevent another from answering, and emancipation becomes a turn from one's needs to the needs of others. Taking responsibility for one's actions and guilt for them becomes only a condition of constant desire to atone for this guilt. Principles and codes of ethics are considered only in the context of promises to another to maintain some jointly defined order. Self-realization and even self-preservation become only the conditions necessary to alleviate the suffering of others (Bartky, S. L.1975, pp. 22-34)

This is not about adopting the values of the public sphere and not about extending the values of the private sphere to the public. Rather, it is necessary to rethink and overestimate the values of both spheres from the perspective of the "humanism of another person" (in the center of which is not me, but the other). (Grimshaw. J. (1993 p. 8-29)

At the same time, one needs to think not in terms of power, strength, realization of one's own inclinations, but in terms of sacrifice, establishing justice in relation to another. The traditional female sphere is easier than the male one to lend itself to such a rethinking, however, and it needs to be changed. She needs to get away from the tendency to isolation and contrasting personal closeness and politics. An active position, risk, and entrepreneurial spirit do not contradict intimacy and care, but they are not independently significant values as in the traditional. Male sphere. They acquire ethical meaning only in the context of service (which is true intimacy). We must be enterprising and active, but not for the sake of self-realization and independence, but because each of us is in his own unique place in life, and no one else can do what is possible only in this place. Our passivity worsens the lives of others.

So, the task of emancipation is not to get rid of part of their duties by transferring them to the shoulders of others, and not to cultivate their own, specifically female, world, but rather to establish a universal human order based on relationships responsibility for others, care about their needs. Otherwise, no spiritual development will be possible,

because, in the words of the French philosopher E. Levinas, "Our spiritual needs are the material needs of others."

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